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We develop a model of competition among health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) to analyze the effects of market power, scale economies, and asymmet-
ric knowledge of health risk on market outcomes. We find that competition
among HMOs may, but need not, ensure socially preferred outcomes. Market
power or scale economies can sometimes admit socially preferred outcomes
when they would otherwise not arise. Asymmetric knowledge of health risk
may or may not be constraining. When it is constraining, a variety of patterns
of incomplete health insurance can arise, along with excessive or insufficient
treatment and preventive care for either high-risk or low-risk individuals.
1. Introduction
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) are now firmly established
as major providers of both health insurance and health care services.1
Therefore, the nature and consequences of market competition among
HMOs warrant careful investigation.
We analyze a simple model of HMO competition in this paper.
Our model admits a preliminary assessment of how market power
may influence outcomes in health-care markets. Such an assessment
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is important because many experts ultimately anticipate only limited
competition among a few large HMOs in many regions of the United
States.2 Our model also admits an analysis of the effects of scale econo-
mies on market outcomes. Such an analysis is important because HMO
operation typically entails large set-up costs.3 We also examine how
asymmetric knowledge of health risks can affect equilibrium outcomes
in health-care markets. Such an examination is relevant because experts
differ regarding the severity and consequences of such information
asymmetries.4
This research focuses in part on the question of whether competi-
tion among HMOs will ensure that socially preferred outcomes are
realized. While society may prefer that different consumers receive
different bundles of health services and health insurance, it is not ob-
vious whether competition will admit such differentiation, particularly
if low-risk patients subsidize their high-risk counterparts under socially
preferred arrangements. We find that while unmitigated competition
among HMOs can preclude socially desired cross-subsidies in some
settings, it does not necessarily do so. In particular, market power or
scale economies can facilitate a congruence between socially preferred
and market outcomes.
This research also focuses on the qualitative differences in socially
preferred and market outcomes that emerge when patients have better
knowledge of their health risks than do HMOs. This superior knowl-
edge may arise because individual patients are better informed about
family health histories, recurring symptoms, or personal habits that
affect the likelihood of illness. We find that asymmetric knowledge of
health risks can, but need not, have important effects both on socially
preferred outcomes and on market outcomes. For instance, copayments
may arise that impose undesirable income variation on risk-averse pa-
tients. Excessive or unduly small levels of preventive care and treat-
ment may also be supplied to limit incentives for misrepresentation of
health risks. Whether such distortions arise depend on the nature of
patients’ preferences regarding the preventive care and treatment pro-
vided by HMOs, and on the market power and operating technologies
of competing HMOs.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
elements of the models we analyze. Sections 3 and 4 isolate the effects of
2. See Anders and Winslow (1995) and Weil (1995), for example.
3. The American Medical Association estimates that startup costs for an HMO may
exceed $15,000,000. (See Winslow, 1995.)
4. See Pauly and Langwell (1983). Also see Marquis (1992), Sloan (1992), and Van
de Ven and Van Vliet (1995) for a sampling of the different views on this matter.
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market power and scale economies by characterizing socially preferred
outcomes and market equilibria in the absence of information asymme-
tries. The effects of asymmetric knowledge of health risks on socially
preferred outcomes and on market equilibria are explored in Sections
5 and 6. Directions for further research are outlined in Section 7. Proofs
of selected formal results are provided in the Appendix.5
Before proceeding, we note that while there are relatively few
formal models of HMO competition in the literature, many authors cite
the classic model, due to Rothschild and Stiglitz (RS) (1976), of adverse
selection in the insurance industry when contemplating the likely ef-
fects of competition in the health-care industry.6 Because insurance is
an important element of the array of services supplied by HMOs, many
of the insights offered by RS are relevant to an analysis of HMO compe-
tition. However, the central findings of RS may not arise in models of
HMO interaction, for three distinct reasons. First, insurance is just one
of many products supplied by HMOs. Second, the HMO market may
ultimately be characterized by a concentration of market power, which
RS did not consider. Third, the technologies of production differ in
HMO and insurance markets. Because of these differences, our analysis
in Section 6 displays a fundamental departure from RS’s main conclu-
sions—that competition among insurance providers under asymmetric
information will preclude a single insurance policy for all consumers
and will prevent low-risk consumers from obtaining full insurance. We
find, in contrast, that if HMO market power or scale economies are
sufficiently pronounced, all consumers may receive identical health
plans and full insurance in equilibrium.7,8
5. Omitted proofs can be found in Encinosa and Sappington (ES) (1995), which is
available from the authors upon request.
6. See, for example, Marquis (1992), Newhouse (1984, 1996), Pauly and Langwell
(1983), and Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1995). Pauly (1986) warns against employing
conclusions from the theoretical literature on insurance markets to obtain predictions
about likely outcomes in health-care markets.
7. More generally, all patients do not necessarily receive the same health plan, but
the premium charged to a patient often does not reflect fully the expected cost of treating
the patient. This finding contrasts with Pauly’s (1984) observation that competition
should be expected to result in premiums that are ‘‘tailored to risk’’ (p. 90). Sloan (1992)
and Pauly (1986) report limited historical tailoring of premiums to risk in practice.
8. Newhouse (1996) provides a related explanation for the limited tailoring of health
plans to health risks that is observed in practice. Newhouse shows that limited tailoring
will arise in the RS framework when the transaction costs of writing and implementing
multiple insurance contracts are sufficiently pronounced. We present conditions under
which the equilibrium in which all patients receive the same efficient health plan is the
unique equilibrium, even when the transactions costs of writing multiple contracts is
arbitrarily small.
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2. Elements of the Model
We begin by describing the basic elements of the models that we ana-
lyze. There are two types of risk-averse patients, denoted 1 and 2. All
patients have initial income y . 0, and value final wealth (Y ) according
to the strictly increasing, strictly concave function u(Y ). Patients differ
according to their health risk. There are n 1 . 0 high-risk patients and
n 2 . 0 low-risk patients. The high-risk patients, who will often be
referred to as type-1 patients, are more likely to become ill than their
low-risk (type-2) counterparts, ceteris paribus. Formally, 0 , q 1 (e ) ,
q 2 (e ) , 1 for all e $ 0, where 1 1 q i (e ) is the probability that a type-
i patient becomes ill after receiving preventive care e. Preventive care
increases at a decreasing rate the probability that the patient is well.
Formally, q′i (e ) $ 0 and q9i (e ) # 0 for all e $ 0, where primes denote
derivatives and where the inequalities are strict unless otherwise
noted.9 In the ensuing analysis, e i will denote the amount of preventive
care received by a type-i patient. The marginal cost of delivering pre-
ventive care is normalized to unity. In practice, preventive care may
include immunizations, routine examinations, and diet counseling.
When a type-i patient becomes ill, his utility from health drops
from H i to H i , where H i . H i . Treatment can help improve the patient’s
health, and thereby increase his utility from health. We will denote by
t i the amount of treatment the type-i patient receives when he is ill.10
Treatment may take the form of prescribed medication or surgical pro-
cedures, for example. Treatment is delivered with constant marginal
cost, c . 0, and is assumed to increase the sick patient’s utility from
health at a decreasing rate. Formally, H ′i ( t i ) $ 0 and H 9i ( t i ) # 0 for
all t i $ 0 for i 4 1, 2, where the inequalities are strict unless otherwise
noted, and where H i ` H i ( t i ) is the type i’s utility from health when
he is sick and receives treatment t i .11 The patient’s utility from health
is always lower when he is sick than when he is well. Formally, H i .
H i ` H i ( t i ) for all t i $ 0. For simplicity, patients’ utility functions,
U i (⋅), are assumed to be separable in wealth (Y ) and health (H ), i.e.,
U i (Y, H i ) 4 u(Y ) ` H i . Furthermore, unless otherwise noted, we
assume throughout that u′(0) . (1/c )H ′i (0) . u′(y ) for i 4 1, 2. In words,
the sick patient’s marginal utility of income exceeds his marginal utility
of expenditures on health care when his wealth is sufficiently small,
9. Unless otherwise noted, q′1 (0) and q′2 (0) are assumed to be sufficiently large that
a strictly positive amount of preventive care is delivered to all patients in equilibrium.
10. The patient’s health status—sick or well—is assumed to be observable and con-
tractible.
11. We assume that H i (0) 4 0 for i 4 1, 2.
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whereas this relative valuation is reversed when his wealth is suffi-
ciently large. This assumption helps ensure an interior solution to the
problems we analyze.
Patients may be charged different amounts according to their
health status (and thereby according to the amount of preventive care
and treatment they receive). We will denote by pwi the total payment
the type-i patient makes when he is well, and by psi the total payment
he makes when he is sick.12 Patients select health-care plans to maxi-
mize their expected welfare. The expected welfare of a type-i patient
who secures a health plan T i is denoted W i (T i ):
W i (T i ) [ q i (e i )[u(y 1 pwi ) ` H i ]
` [1 1 q i (e i )][u(y 1 psi ) ` H i ` H i ( t i )], (1)
where T i [ (p wi , psi , t i , e i ). A patient’s expected welfare is simply his
utility when well and his utility when sick, weighted by the probability
that each of these states of health occurs. A type-i individual who does
not purchase a health-care plan obtains expected welfare W i [ u(y ) `
q i (0)H i ` [1 1 q i (0)] H i .
The (extranormal) profit a health-care firm (i.e., an HMO) earns
depends on the services it supplies and the fees it imposes. p i (T i ) will
denote the unit profit the HMO anticipates on a type-i patient when
the patient selects health plan T i [ (pwi , pwi , t i , e i ). Formally,
p i (T i ) [ q i (e i )pwi ` [1 1 q i (e i )][psi 1 ct i ] 1 e i . (2)
An HMO’s overall expected profit depends on its unit expected profit
on each patient type that is served, on the number of such patients,
and on the HMO’s fixed costs of production.
We will explore the interaction between two HMOs, labeled A
and B. For simplicity, we assume that patients perceive the treatment
and care delivered by the two HMOs to be identical. Furthermore, both
HMOs are able to credibly commit to deliver all of the treatment and
care that they promise to patients.13 The two firms also have the same
variable operating costs. The firms differ only in their fixed costs of
production. Firm A’s fixed costs of production (F A $ 0) are no larger
than those of firm B (F B ). This advantage for firm A may stem from
an incumbency advantage (which reduces set-up costs or advertising
12. One could view pwi as an initial premium for health insurance and preventive
care, and psi 1 pwi as a subsequent copayment for treatment.
13. This assumption may be justified by reputational concerns in a fully intertemporal
analysis.
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costs), for example. For convenience, we also assume that firm B’s fixed
costs of production are always less than the profit a monopoly firm
could earn if it had no fixed costs and faced no potential entry.14
3. The Complete Information Social Optimum
First consider the outcome a social planner would dictate if she had
perfect knowledge of patient preferences and production technologies,
and for simplicity, if she valued the welfare of each patient equally.15
The planner would choose health plans to maximize patients’ expected
welfare, while ensuring nonnegative profit for the least-cost producer.
Formally, the planner’s problem, [SP], is
Maximize
T 1 ,T 2
O2
i41
n i W i (T i ) subject to On
i41
n ip i (T i ) 1 F A $ 0.
Lemma 1 summarizes the key features of the ideal outcome from
the social perspective.
Lemma 1: At the solution to [SP]:
(i) full income insurance is provided, so pwi 4 psi [ p i for i 4 1, 2;
(ii) all patients are charged the same premium, so p 1 4 p 2 ;
(iii) the efficient level of treatment ( t*i (p i )) is provided to all patients
who become ill, so u′(y 1 p i ) 4 (1/c ) H ′i ( t i );
(iv) the efficient level of preventive care (e*(p i , t i )) is delivered to all
patients, so
∂W i (⋅)/∂e i





q′i (e i ) DH i (T i )
u′(y 1 p i )
4 q′i (e i )ct i 1 1,
where DH i (T i ) 4 H i 1 [H i ` H i ( t i )]; and
(v) the supplier earns zero profit.
The conclusions reported in Lemma 1 are all quite intuitive. Co-
payments (pwi ≠ psi ) are not imposed because patients are averse to
14. Formally, we assume that F B , pm [ n 1p 1 (T m1 ) ` n 2p 2 (T m2 ), where T m [
(T m1 , T m2 ) is the solution to the monopoly problem [M], defined as $Maximize T ∑ 2i41
n ip i (T i ) subject to W i (T i ) $ W i for i 4 1, 2}. This assumption helps ensure that in the
equilibria analyzed below, no firm ever earns more profit than it would earn in the
hypothetical monopoly setting.
15. A more general case is examined in ES (1995).
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income risk.16 All patients are charged the same premium because the
welfare of all patients is valued equally. Treatment is delivered to all
sick patients up to the point where the extra utility that treatment af-
fords a patient per dollar of expenditure is equal to the patient’s mar-
ginal utility of income. Similarly, preventive care is provided up to the
point where its net marginal cost to the supplier is equal to its net
marginal benefit per dollar to the patient.17
One implication of Lemma 1 is recorded in Corollary 1, which
refers to Assumptions 1 and 2. Assumption 1 states that low-risk and
high-risk patients have identical preferences regarding health status
and treatment. Assumption 2 states that preventive care has the same
marginal effect on all patients. Together, these assumptions ensure that
high-risk patients are more costly to serve than low-risk patients, and
so are subsidized by low-risk patients at the social optimum.
Assumption 1: H 1 4 H 2 ; H 1 4 H 2 ; and H 1 ( t ) 4 H 2 ( t ) for all t $
0.
Assumption 2: q′1 ( e ) 4 q′2 (e ) for all e $ 0.
Corollary 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then p 1 4 p 2 , t 1
4 t 2 , and e 1 4 e 2 , and so p 1 (T 1 ) , p 2 (T 2 ) at the solution to [SP].
4. Duopoly Competition with Complete
Information
We now examine the outcome of unfettered competition between two
potential suppliers of health services when the suppliers can costlessly
observe each patient’s type and are free to offer different health plans
to different patients.
Formally, we analyze a duopoly game in which the two firms
initially propose health plans simultaneously. All patients then observe
the proposed plans and decide which plan (if any) to accept. Each
16. Copayments could be optimal under alternative specifications of patient prefer-
ences. If, for example, a patient’s utility from wealth Y and health H were U (Y ` H )
where U ′(⋅) . 0 and U 9(⋅) , 0, then by setting psi , pwi , the social planner could help
insure the patient against utility variation caused by variations in health.
17. The supplier’s net marginal cost of delivering e i is the difference between the
direct marginal cost, 1, and the expected cost savings from reduced treatment costs,
q′i (e i )ct i . The patient’s net marginal benefit from e i is his marginal rate of substitution
of p i for e i , which is the ratio of his marginal expected utility from increased e [q′i (e i )
DH i ] to his marginal utility of income [u′(y 1 p i )]. In the ensuing discussion, we will
denote by t*i (p i ) and e*i (p i , t i ), respectively, (conditionally) efficient treatment and care
levels for type-i patients.
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patient accepts at most one plan, and randomizes between plans that
offer identical levels of expected utility. r j [ [0, 1] will denote the frac-
tion of patients that, when indifferent between plans, select firm j’s
plan (where j 4 A, B and r A ` r B 4 1). After observing the patients’
choices, the firms decide simultaneously whether to enter the market.
If a firm enters, it serves all patients that selected its plan. If only one
firm enters, that firm can (and will) also serve all patients that initially
selected the rival’s plan if doing so does not reduce the profits of the
entering firm. A firm sinks its fixed costs of production upon entry. We
assume that each firm enters the market when it is indifferent between
entering and not entering. Our focus is on characterizing the (pure-
strategy) Nash equilibria of this complete information duopoly game.18
Proposition 1 summarizes the effect of competition in the absence
of scale economies.
Proposition 1: Suppose F A 4 F B 4 0. Then there is a unique (pure-
strategy) equilibrium of the complete -information duopoly game in which the
two firms offer the same health plan, and firm j serves r j [n 1 ` n 2 ] patients
( j 4 A, B ). Each firm makes zero unit expected profit on each patient. Patients
face no copayments (so pwi 4 psi [ p i for i 4 1, 2) and receive efficient
treatment and care levels given the premiums they are charged (so t i
4 t*i (p i ) and e i 4 e*i (p i , t i )). Furthermore, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold,
then, relative to the social optimum: (i) the low-risk patients pay a smaller
premium and receive more treatment and more preventive care; and (ii) the
high-risk patients pay a larger premium and receive less treatment and less
preventive care.
Proposition 1 reports that when the competitors are identical,
when patient characteristics are observable and contractible, and when
there are no fixed costs of production, competition eliminates cross
subsidies, even those that are socially desirable. In other words, compe-
tition forces premiums to reflect costs of service. Competition also en-
sures that the expected welfare of each patient type is maximized, sub-
ject to the restriction that the firm must earn exactly zero expected
18. This game and its Nash equilibria are described more formally in ES (1995). Notice
that in this game, the two firms compete for patients in Bertrand-like fashion before they
incur any sunk costs. Such competition may be representative of situations in which
rival HMOs bid for the right to serve the employees of a large corporation, for example.
[See Che and Gale (1997) for a useful analysis of how a buyer alliance may optimally
structure competition among HMOs.]
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profit on each type. Therefore, efficient treatment and care levels are
delivered once premiums are (risk-)adjusted to reflect expected costs.19
In the presence of market power or scale economies, competition
need not eliminate cross subsidies. The Bertrand-like competition that
we analyze does restrict firm A’s profit to the magnitude of its fixed-
cost advantage (F B 1 F A ), but it does not preclude cross subsidies
between patient types. When F B . F A, any allocation of fixed costs
among patients that generates profit F B 1 F A for firm A and precludes
firm B from profitably serving any subset of patients can arise in equi-
librium. Similarly, when the two HMOs have the same strictly positive
level of fixed costs, there are many ways that these fixed costs can be
reflected in premiums while dissipating all rents and ensuring that no
supplier can profitably serve a subset of patients. These facts are re-
flected in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: When F B . F A, there exist a continuum of pure-strat-
egy Nash equilibria in the complete -information duopoly game in which firm
A serves all patients. If F B 4 F A . 0, two such continua of equilibria exist,
one in which firm A serves all patients and the other in which firm B serves
all patients. At every equilibrium: (i) the firm that serves all patients earns
profit F B 1 F A; (ii) no copayments are levied (so pwi 4 psi 4 p i for i 4 1,
2); and (iii) efficient treatment and care levels are delivered (so t i 4 t*i (p i )
and e i 4 e*i ( t i , p i )). At equilibrium s [ [0, 1], the health plan selected by
type-i patients is the solution to the problem [W i (s )], defined as
$MaximizeTi W i (T i ) subject to: (1) n ip i (T i ) 4 ƒ i (s )F
B; and (2) W i (T i )
$ W i }, where ƒ 2 (s ) 4 s and ƒ 1 (s ) 4 1 1 s. Furthermore, at those equilibria
where the producer earns a higher (respectively, a lower) unit expected profit
p i (⋅) on type-i patients than at the social optimum, these patients are charged
a higher (respectively, a lower) premium and receive less (respectively, more)
treatment and care than at the social optimum.
Proposition 2 reports that competition ensures efficient (although
not necessarily socially optimal) outcomes even in the presence of mar-
ket power or scale economies. Duplicative fixed costs are avoided, since
a single supplier serves all patients. Furthermore, once the fraction of
firm B’s fixed costs that will be recovered from the unit profit generated
by serving each type of patient is determined, patient welfare is maxi-
mized, subject to ensuring the specified unit profit from each patient
19. Higher premiums increase the marginal utility of income and therefore reduce
efficient care and treatment levels, ceteris paribus. Consequently, when competition im-
poses higher premiums on high-risk patients, they receive less preventive care and less
treatment when ill.
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type. Firm A is indifferent among the many ways to allocate fixed costs
across patients in our model, so continua of equilibria can arise.
The flexibility that competing firms have in assigning fixed costs
of production across patient types admits the possibility that both types
of patients will receive the same health plan in equilibrium. This possi-
bility arises, for example, when: (i) patients’ preferences are sufficiently
similar (so Assumptions 1 and 2 hold); and (ii) firm B’s fixed costs are
sufficiently large that firm B cannot profitably attract only the low-risk
patients from firm A when firm A offers to all patients the health plan
that maximizes the expected welfare of high-risk patients while gener-
ating zero expected profit on these patients. Condition (ii), along with
a convenient upper bound on F B, is stated formally in the Appendix
as Assumptions 3–5.
Proposition 3: Suppose assumptions 1–5 hold. Then there is a
(unique) pooling Nash equilibrium of the complete-information duopoly game
at which all patients receive the same health plan (so T 1 4 T 2 ). This health
plan entails no copayments (so pwi 4 psi [ p i ) and provides efficient treatment
and care levels (so t i 4 t*i (psi ) and e i 4 e*i (p i , t i )). Only one firm serves
all patients, and that firm earns profit F B 1 F A at this equilibrium.
To interpret Proposition 3, suppose firm A offered to all patients
the same (efficient) health plan that generates expected profit F B 1 F A
for firm A. Since low-risk patients are less costly to serve than high-
risk patients, this uniform health plan would generate more than (1/n )
(F B 1 F A ) in profit on each low-risk patient. If firm B’s fixed costs of
production (F B ) were sufficiently small, firm B could profitably attract
just the low-risk patients with a health plan that they prefer to the
single plan offered to all patients by firm A. In contrast, when F B is
sufficiently large, firm B will be unable to profitably attract only the
low-risk patients, because its average cost of serving just these patients
will be too large. Most importantly, as F B increases, the reduced scale
economies that firm B suffers when it serves only the low-risk patients
eventually outweigh the cost savings from serving a lower-cost (but
smaller) population. Consequently, when F B is sufficiently large, firm
B will not be able to upset the pooling equilibrium identified in Proposi-
tion 3, which we will refer to as the sp equilibrium.
As we show in Section 6, this (sp ) equilibrium with no risk adjust-
ing (so all patients receive the same health plan despite differences in
their expected treatment costs) may persist even when patients are
privately informed about their health risk. Furthermore, the sp equilib-
rium will be the unique equilibrium under the identified assumptions
if firms incur strictly positive (but even arbitrarily small) transactions
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costs when they offer more than a single health plan.20 Absent transac-
tions costs, a continuum of equilibria characterized by partial risk ad-
justing can arise in which high-risk patients pay more than low-risk
patients for the health insurance they receive, but the premium differen-
tial is less than the corresponding difference in expected treatment
costs. The central observation here is that scale economies can provide
HMOs with leeway to implement little or no risk adjusting, even in
competitive markets.21
5. The Social Optimum with Adverse Selection
Now consider the adverse-selection setting, where patients have better
knowledge of their health risk than do health-care suppliers (perhaps
because of superior knowledge of past health problems or personal
activities that affect one’s health, for example).22 Formally, each patient
alone knows his health risk (i.e., his type). The two suppliers and the
social planner know that there are n i patients of type i, but cannot
discern any individual patient’s type.23
The socially preferred outcomes in this adverse-selection setting










n ip i (T i ) 1 F A $ 0 (4)
and
W i (T i ) $ W i (T k ) for k ≠ i, for all i,k 4 1,2. (5)
20. The uniqueness holds because all other equilibrium configurations entail greater
total cost. Thus, Newhouse’s (1996) insight extends in this setting to the case of arbitrarily
small transactions costs.
21. High-risk patients may even be afforded more treatment, more preventive care,
and a lower premium than their low-risk counterparts. This possibility arises when As-
sumptions 1 and 2 hold, and Assumptions 3–5 hold as strict inequalities. See ES (1995)
for details.
22. Marquis (1992) provides evidence of adverse selection resulting from asymmetric
knowledge of health risks in practice.
23. HMOs can often identify directly and discriminate against severe health risks in
practice. See Light (1992), Sloan (1992), and Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1995), for example.
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The social planner again seeks to maximize patients’ expected welfare
while ensuring nonnegative profit using the least-cost technology. The
self-selection constraints (5) indicate that in this adverse selection set-
ting, patients must be induced, not simply ordered, to select the treat-
ment plan that the social planner would like them to select.
The self-selection constraints do not always constrain the social
planner. For instance, when all patients value treatment and preventive
care in the same manner (so that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold), the social
optimum will entail identical premiums, preventive care, and treatment
for all patients. When the social planner offers only this single ideal
health plan to all patients, adverse-selection concerns do not arise.
The social planner may also be unconstrained by her limited infor-
mation about patient type when the two types of patients value treat-
ment and care very differently. To illustrate, Lemma 2 considers an
extreme case where preventive care reduces the likelihood of illness
only for the low-risk patients, while treatment only improves the health
of high-risk patients who are ill.24 In this setting, neither type of patient
values the service provided to the other type of patient, and so neither
has an incentive to purchase the health plan intended for his counter-
part.
Lemma 2: Suppose 0 4 H ′2 ( t ) , H ′1 ( t ) for all t $ 0 and 0 4 q′1 (e )
, q′2 (e ) for all e $ 0. Then at the solution to [SP-A]:
(i) there are no copayments, and each patient is charged the same pre-
mium (so p 1 4 p 2 ); and
(ii) all patients receive the treatment and care that is efficient for them
(so t 1 4 t*1 (p 1 ) . 0 4 t*2 (p 2 ) 4 t 2 and e 2 4 e*2 (p 2 , t 2 ) . 0
4 e*1 (p 1 , t 1 ) 4 e 1 ).
More generally, private knowledge of health risk may constrain
the social planner, and inefficient pricing, treatment, and/or care may
result. To provide just one illustration, suppose high-risk patients be-
come sick more often and suffer a greater loss in utility when they do
become sick, but are otherwise identical to low-risk patients. In this
setting, the social planner would like to charge all patients the same
premium but provide more preventive care to high-risk patients. How-
ever, since low-risk patients value preventive care, they will prefer
the health plan intended for high-risk patients. To deliver additional
preventive care solely to high-risk patients, the social planner raises
24. These extreme assumptions are useful, but not necessary, to make the more gen-
eral point that the self-selection constraints need not bind at the solution to [SP-A] when
patients’ valuations of treatment and care are sufficiently different.
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the expected price of the increased care, and charges the patient more
when he is well than when he is sick (through a partial rebate of the
initial premium when the patient becomes ill, for example). This pay-
ment arrangement is particularly unattractive to the low-risk patient,
who is less likely to become ill and so is relatively unlikely to receive
the partial premium rebate. The social planner also provides more than
the efficient level of care to high-risk patients. Doing so renders the
health plan intended for high-risk patients differentially attractive to
them, since they value the extra care more than their low-risk counter-
parts. These conclusions are summarized in Lemma 3.25
Lemma 3: Suppose q′1 (e ) 4 q′2 (e ) for all e $ 0, H ′1 ( t ) 4 H ′2 ( t ) for all
t $ 0, and H 1 1 H 1 . H 2 1 H 2 . Then at the solution to [SP-A]:
(i) high-risk patients always pay more for health care than low-risk
patients, and pay the most when they are well ( so pw1 . ps1 .
pw2 4 ps2 [ p 2 );
(ii) the efficient level of treatment is provided to all sick patients, so
low-risk patients receive less treatment ( i.e., t 1 4 t*1 (ps1 ) ,
t*2 (p 2 ) 4 t 2 ); and
(iii) high-risk patients receive more than the efficient level of preventive
care, while low-risk patients receive the efficient level of care (so
e 1 . e*1 (pw1 , psi , t 1 ) and e 2 4 e*2 (p 2 , t 2 )).
6. Duopoly Competition with Adverse Selection
Having illustrated some of the many new effects that private knowl-
edge of health risk can introduce even in the social optimum, we turn
now to the question of whether competition among health-care provid-
ers in the presence of adverse selection will give rise to socially optimal
outcomes. We model competition here exactly as in the complete-infor-
mation setting. To review briefly, the two potential producers initially
propose health plans simultaneously. Each patient then selects at most
one plan. After observing the patients’ choices, the firms decide simul-
taneously whether to enter. If a firm enters, it incurs its fixed costs of
production and delivers the health plan it promised. We refer to this
interaction when each patient’s risk type is known only to that patient
25. Since all patients value treatment ( t ) identically on the margin, efficient treatment
levels are delivered to all patients. However, since the high-risk patients pay more for
their plan, they have a higher marginal utility of income when sick. Consequently, as
Lemma 3 reports, the efficient treatment level is smaller for the high-risk patients. Other
qualitative distortions that can arise in socially preferred outcomes in the adverse-selec-
tion setting are analyzed in ES (1995).
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as the asymmetric-information duopoly game. Our focus is on (pure-
strategy) Nash equilibria of this game.
Whether competition among HMOs will ensure socially optimal
outcomes depends upon patient characteristics and production tech-
nologies. If the two potential producers have no fixed costs of produc-
tion, and if the patients’ valuations of the multiple services offered by
the firms are sufficiently distinct (e.g., if only high-risk patients benefit
from treatment and only low-risk patients value preventive care), then
competition will ensure efficient treatment and care levels and the ab-
sence of copayments, but will not ensure the socially preferred pre-
mium levels.
Proposition 4: Suppose (i) F A 4 F B 4 0, (ii) 0 4 H ′2 ( t ) , H ′1 ( t )
for all t $ 0, and (iii) 0 4 q′1 (e ) , q′2 (e ) for all e $ 0. Then there is a unique
(pure-strategy) equilibrium of the asymmetric -information duopoly game in
which firm j serves r j [n 1 ` n 2 ] patients and makes zero unit expected profit
on each patient. No copayments are charged (pwi 4 psi [ p i for i 4 1, 2),
efficient treatment levels are provided ( t 1 4 t*1 (p 1 ) . t*2 (⋅) 4 0 4 t 2 ), and
efficient preventive care is delivered (e 2 4 e*2 (p 2 , t 2 ) . e*1 (⋅) 4 0 4 e 1 ).
Proposition 4, like Proposition 1, emphasizes that in the absence
of scale economies, competition among identical suppliers will drive
premiums to reflect costs, and thereby eliminate cross subsidies. Propo-
sition 4 also points out that when patients’ valuations of different health
services are sufficiently distinct, the same (efficient, but not socially
optimal) outcomes that arise under complete information also arise
under asymmetric information. The information asymmetry is of no
consequence here because the patients’ preferences are so diverse that
high-risk patients do not find it attractive to misrepresent their innate
characteristics in order to secure the health plan intended for low-risk
patients.
When patients’ valuations are more congruent, however, private
knowledge of health risk can cause the market outcome to diverge from
the socially optimal outcome in additional ways. To illustrate, recall
that under Assumptions 1 and 2 all patients value treatment in identical
fashion, and preventive care affects each patient’s likelihood of illness
in the same manner. These assumptions ensure that high-risk patients
are systematically more costly to serve than low-risk patients, just as
in RS’s model of the insurance industry where some consumers are
systematically more prone to accidents than others.26 Consequently, as
RS have shown, if there are no fixed costs of production, a (pooling)
26. This congruity is demonstrated more precisely in ES (1995).
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equilibrium in which all patients purchase the same health plan cannot
arise. An identical plan for all patients that yields zero expected profit
generates positive rent on the low-risk patients. Consequently, a com-
petitor can profitably return some of this rent to low-risk patients (with-
out attracting high-risk patients), and thereby eliminate the zero-profit
pooling equilibrium.
This is not necessarily the case in the presence of scale economies,
however. A firm that attempts to serve only the low-risk patients faces
higher average fixed costs of production than another firm that serves
all patients. If this cost disadvantage is sufficiently pronounced, it may
be impossible for a firm to profitably attract only the low-risk patients
when a competing firm offers the same health plan to all patients. Con-
sequently, a pooling equilibrium with efficient pricing and treatment
may exist even when patients’ characteristics are structured to parallel
the characteristics that RS examine. Furthermore, if the two firms are
identical so that competition eliminates all profit, the single health plan
that is offered will be the socially optimal plan. These conclusions are
recorded formally in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: Suppose Assumptions 1–5 hold. Then the sp equilib-
rium of the complete -information duopoly game is an equilibrium of the asym-
metric -information duopoly game. At this equilibrium, all patients receive
the same health plan. The plan entails no copayments and provides efficient
treatment and care levels (so pwi 4 psi [ p i , t i 4 t*i (psi ), and e i 4 e*i (p i ,
t i ) for i 4 1, 2). If F A 4 F B, this plan is the socially optimal plan. If F B .
F A, this plan imposes a higher premium and provides less treatment than the
socially optimal plan.
Proposition 5 indicates that competition and adverse selection
need not result in different health plans for different types of patients,
or in inefficient levels of treatment and care. In fact, if there are any
transactions costs (however small) associated with offering different
health plans (recall Newhouse, 1996) and if Assumptions 1–5 hold,
then the sp equilibrium with no risk adjusting will be the unique equilib-
rium of the asymmetric-information duopoly game.
Absent transactions costs, other equilibria arise in which patients
with different health risks select different health plans, and these plans
may not ensure efficient treatment. Proposition 6 illustrates this point.
The statement of the proposition refers to T
˜
s, which is the solution to
problem [WA-s], defined as: $MaximizeT1,T2 n 1 W 1 (T 1 ) ` n 2 W 2 (T 2 )
subject to, for i, k 4 1, 2: (1) W i (T i ) $ W i (T k ) for k ≠ i; (2) n ip i (T i )
4 ƒi (s )F B, where ƒ2 (s ) 4 s [ [0, 1] and ƒ1 (s ) 4 1 1 s; and (3) W i (T i )
$ W i }. The statement also refers to health plans (T 11 and T m2 ) that are
defined in Assumptions 3 and 4 in the Appendix. Proposition 6 also
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refers to assumption 6, which serves to simplify the model by ruling
out copayments and ensuring that preventive care is never provided
in equilibrium (since it has no effect on patient health).
Assumption 6: q′1 ( e ) 4 q′2 (e ) 4 0 for all e $ 0, and copayments are
not permitted.
Proposition 6: Suppose F A 4 F B . 0, and Assumptions 1, 5, and 6
hold. Then for any n 1 . 0, there exists an ñ 2 . 0 such that for any n 2 $
ñ 2 and n 2p 2 (T 11 ) # F B # n 2p 2 (T m2 ), T
˜
1 is a separating Nash equilibrium
of the asymmetric -information duopoly game in which one firm serves all
patients and makes zero profit. At this equilibrium, the low-risk patients select
a health plan that provides efficient treatment (so t2 4 t*2 (p 2 )). The high-
risk patients select a health plan with a higher premium (so p 1 . p 2 ) and
more than the efficient level of treatment ( i.e., t 1 . t*1 (p1 )).
Proposition 6 illustrates that even when the two potential sup-
pliers have identical technologies and even when the only relevant
differences among patients are those analyzed by RS, distortions that
are qualitatively different from those identified by RS can emerge in
equilibrium.27 If, for reasons outside of our model, the supplier decides
to charge low-risk patients a premium that reflects both the variable
costs of serving them and all fixed costs of production, the low-risk
patients may prefer a health plan intended for high-risk patients, whose
premium does not incorporate any fixed costs. To prevent low-risk
patients from selecting the health plan intended for high-risk patients,
the supplier can increase the level of treatment promised to high-risk
patients (even beyond its efficient level) and raise the premium accord-
ingly. Because high-risk patients are more likely to become ill, they
value a promise of increased treatment when ill more highly than do
low-risk patients. Consequently, providing an inefficiently large level
of treatment to high-risk patients (and charging them accordingly) can
best discourage low-risk patients from selecting the health plan in-
tended for high-risk patients.
Most importantly, a supplier’s flexibility in assigning fixed costs
of production across patient types while precluding profitable opera-
tion by a rival can cause self-selection constraints to bind in different
ways than they bind in RS’s analysis. The result can be distortions that
differ qualitatively from those identified by RS.
In concluding, we emphasize that although the fixed costs and
27. This result may be surprising in light of the fact that Stiglitz (1977) identifies the
same qualitative distortions in a monopoly setting (where scale economies are present)
that RS identify in a competitive setting with no scale economies.
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multiple services in our model admit conclusions that differ qualita-
tively from those drawn by RS, important similarities can also emerge.
As in RS, there may be no Nash equilibrium in our asymmetric informa-
tion duopoly model if fixed costs of production and the proportion of
high-risk patients are both sufficiently small.28 The distortions identi-
fied by RS can also emerge if the incumbent assigns relatively few of
the fixed costs of production to the low-risk patients. Therefore, the
useful insights provided by RS should not be ignored. Instead, the
importance of the distinguishing features of the RS model should be
recognized before the model is employed to predict the outcome of
competition among HMOs.
7. Conclusion
The primary purpose of this research was to develop a simple model
of HMO competition, in order to analyze the effects of market power,
scale economies, and asymmetric information in health-care markets.
We found that competition among HMOs can, but need not, cause
market outcomes to diverge from socially preferred outcomes. Market
power or scale economies can provide HMOs with some leeway in
designing profitable health plans. This leeway may be employed to
limit the extent to which health-care premiums are adjusted to reflect
patient risk. Asymmetric knowledge of health risk, coupled with mar-
ket power or scale economies, can also result in incomplete insurance
for either high-risk patients or low-risk patients. However, the rich set
of policy instruments available to HMOs can sometimes enable them
to render inconsequential information asymmetries that would be
problematic in insurance markets.
The fact that a great variety of findings emerge from a relatively
simple model of HMO interaction reinforces the obvious fact that the
market for health services is an intricate and complex one that defies
simple characterization. Significant additional research is clearly in
order, particularly in the following four directions.
First, different patient characteristics should be considered. For
instance, patients’ preferences may not be separable in income and
health. Furthermore, different patients have different income levels,
and limited ability to pay for medical services or health insurance can
28. A Nash equilibrium fails to exist in RS’s model only when n 2 is sufficiently larger
than n 1 . In contrast, in the setting of Proposition 6, our model admits a separating Nash
equilibrium whenever n 2 is sufficiently larger than n 1 , provided F B is of appropriate
magnitude.
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cause additional discrepancies between socially preferred outcomes
and market outcomes. Patients also generally differ according to the
severity of their condition when they become ill.
Second, additional differences among HMOs should be explored.
HMOs typically have different variable and fixed costs of production.
Furthermore, HMOs often specialize in the delivery of particular
health-care services. HMOs can also differ in the quality of the services
they deliver, in their reputations, and in their knowledge of patients’
health risks.29,30
Third, alternative depictions of competition among HMOs war-
rant investigation. In contrast to the simplifying assumption of our
model, it is generally prohibitively costly for HMOs to specify in ad-
vance all relevant aspects of health care that they will deliver.31 Further-
more, the possibility always exists that an HMO may renege on a prom-
ise about the service it will deliver. For these reasons and others,
patients may be reluctant to switch HMOs, or to leave a fee-for-service
arrangement to enroll in an HMO. A patient’s choice of an HMO may
also depend critically on the particular physicians associated with dif-
ferent HMOs.
Fourth, the many different ways in which governments intervene
in health-care markets warrant careful attention.32
Appendix
Assumption 3: F B # P
ˆ
[ n 1p 1 (T m2 ) ` n 2p 2 (T m2 ) when Assumption
2 holds, where T m is the solution to the monopoly problem [M], defined in
footnote 14.
Assumption 4: F B $ n 2p 2 (T 11 ) when Assumption 2 holds, where
T si is the solution to problem [W i (s )], defined in Proposition 2.
Assumption 5: W 2 (T 11 ) $ W 2 when Assumption 2 holds.
Assumption 3 ensures that firm B’s fixed costs do not exceed the
29. See Gaynor and Ma (1994), Ma (1994), Ma and Burgess (1993), and Wolinsky
(1995) for models of health-care markets in which quality differentiation plays a key role.
30. In our model, if firm A knows patients’ types while firm B does not, then when
F A 4 F B 4 0, both firms will earn zero profit serving high-risk patients, while firm A
will attract all low-risk patients and earn an information rent in doing so. This rent may
also allow firm A to operate as the sole supplier even when F A . F B.
31. See Newhouse (1984). Ma and McGuire (1995) and Chalkley and Malcomson
(1995) provide formal analyses of settings where critical elements of health-care services
are not contractible.
32. See Newhouse (1992) for useful observations on this point.
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variable profit firm A would secure from delivering to all patients the
component of the profit-maximizing health plan designed for low-risk
patients. This assumption helps to ensure that all patients prefer the
health plan they receive in equilibrium to no health plan. Assumption
4 places the lower bound on F B described in the text. Assumption 5
ensures that this lower bound is strictly less than the upper bound
specified in Assumption 3.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose F B . 0. The first-order conditions of
the program [W i (s )] for i 4 1, 2 reveal that p 2 (T s2 ) is increasing in s
and that p i (T s1 ) is decreasing in s for i 4 1, 2. Since p 2 (T 02 ) 4
p 1(T 11 ) 4 0, continuity and the maintained assumptions ensure that
there exists a unique sp [ [0, `) such that
p 2 (T s
p
2 ) 4 p 2 (T s
p
1 ). (A1)
By Assumptions 1 and 2, each T spi for i 4 1, 2 must satisfy the
same first-order condition:
cu′(y 1 p i ) 4 H ′( t i ) 4
cq′(e i )
1 1 cq′(e i )t i
[H i 1 H i 1 H i ( t i )]. (A2)
(A1) and (A2) imply that T sp1 4 T s
p
2 .
Next, note that entry by the rival will not be precluded if sp . 1,
because n 2P 2 . F B in this case. Furthermore, sp [ [0, 1] if and only if
p 2 (T 12 ) $ p 2 (T 11 ). [Recall p 1 (T 11 ) 4 0 and p 1 (T s1 ) , 0 for all s . 1.]
Assumption 4 ensures that this inequality holds, since n 2p 2 (T 12 ) 4
F B. That is, sp [ [0, 1] if and only if
F B $ n 2p 2 (T 11 ). (A3)
Next, we verify that T spi satisfies the individual rationality con-
straints:
W i (T s
p
i ) $ W i for i 4 1, 2. (A4)
Note that W i (T s
p
i ) $ W i if and only if p i (T s
p
i ) # p i (T mi ) for i 4 1, 2.
Thus, a necessary condition for the existence of an F B which satisfies
both (A3) and (A4) is that p 2 (T 11 ) # p 2 (T m2 ). This inequality is guaran-
teed by Assumption 5.
Finally, we identify the largest value of F B for which (A4) is satis-
fied under the sp health plan. Notice that (A4) holds at sp if and only
if
n 1p 1 (T s
p
1 ) ` n 2p 2 (T s
p
2 ) # n 1p 1 (T m2 ) ` n 2p 2 (T m2 ). (A5)
This conclusion follows from the necessary conditions associated with
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the monopoly problem [M] defined in footnote 14. These conditions
imply that n 1p 1 (T m2 ) ` n 2p 2 (T m2 ) , n 1p 1 (T m1 ) ` n 2p 2 (T m1 ). As-
sumption 3 guarantees that inequality (A5) holds. Therefore, for each
value of F B for which n 2p 2 (T 11 ) # F B # n 1p 1 (T m2 ) ` n 2p 2 (T m2 ), there
exists a unique pooling Nash equilibrium of the complete-information
duopoly game at sp [ [0, 1] in which all patients choose the same health
plan. M
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is straightforward, once it is verified
that no self-selection constraints bind in equilibrium. This fact follows
from the observation that at the identified equilibrium, (1) W 1 (T 1 ) $
W 1 . W 1 1 [u(y ) 1 u(y 1 p 2 )] 4 W 1 (T 2 ) and (2) W 2 (T 2 ) $ W 2 .
W 2 1 [u(y ) 1 u(y 1 p 1 )] 4 W 2 (T 1 ). M
Proof of Proposition 5: First notice that the rival firm is unable to
make a profit and attract some or all patients from the incumbent at
the sp equilibrium. If the rival firm could do so, the sp equilibrium
would not be an equilibrium of the complete-information duopoly
game.
Notice further that the incumbent firm cannot earn more than F B
1 F A by offering any other separating or pooling contract. Therefore,
the incumbent weakly prefers the sp equilibrium to any other equilib-
rium of the asymmetric information duopoly game. M
Proof of Proposition 6: Since F A 4 F B, it is evident that any candidate
for an equilibrium of the asymmetric information duopoly game must








2 ) will be an equilibrium of this
game if it is not Pareto-dominated (i.e., if there does not exist another
solution to [WA-s] that is preferred to T
˜
1 by both types of patients).
We will show that for any given n 1 . 0 and p 2 (T 11 ) # b # p 2 (T m2 ),
there exists an n̂ 2 (b ) . 0 such that T
˜
1 is not Pareto-dominated when
n 2 $ n̂ 2 (b ) and F B 4 bn 2 . To do so, first notice that because b #
p 2 (T m2 ), the individual rationality constraints (3) in [WA-s] are satisfied
at T
˜
1. Now, let G [ $T
˜
s




I P [ $T | W 2 (T ) 4 W 2 (T s
p )}. The necessary conditions for a solution
to [WA-s] reveal that G is bounded from above by I and from below




Furthermore, as n 2 → `, I p converges pointwise to I. Therefore, G con-
verges to I pointwise in s as n 2 → `.
Next, note that W 1 (T ) # W 1 (T
˜
1




T [ I with p 1 (T ) $ 0. Since G converges to I pointwise in s as n 2 →
`, there exists an n̂ 2 (b ) . 0 such that W 1 (T ) # W 1 (T
˜
1
1 ) (with equality
only at s 4 1) for T [ G with p 1 (T ) $ 0, for all n 2 $ n̂ 2 (b ). Therefore,
T
˜
1 is not Pareto-dominated by T
˜
s for any s $ sp when n 2 $ n̂ 2 (b ).
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When s , sp, the necessary conditions for a solution to [WA-s]
reveal that W 1 (T
˜
s
1 ) , W 1 (T
˜
sp
1 ) , W 1 (T
˜
1
1 ). Consequently, T
˜
1 is not
Pareto dominated for any s [ [0, 1).
Therefore, T
˜
1 is a Nash equilibrium at b when n 2 $ n̂ 2 (b ). The
proof is completed by defining ñ 2 [ maxb n̂ 2 (b ). This maximum exists
because [p 2 (T 11 ), p 2 (T m1 )] is compact. M
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